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Abstract
This article explores the extensive casualization of work and its impact on the working 
life of the people in South Korea after the financial crisis in 1997. A drastic increase 
in precarious workers was an immediate consequence of the neoliberal economic 
reform implemented by the new democratic government, including the enhancement 
of flexibility in the labor market and the restructuring of the financial market, under 
the guidance of the International Monetary Fund. Precarious work in South Korea 
has dramatically increased in the past decade, including both nonregular workers and 
precarious self-employment in the formal sector. Above all, proliferation of new types 
of nonregular employment in the 2000s has witnessed the significant transformation 
of the world of work in South Korea, deepening inequality and poverty. The extremely 
liberalized labor market tends to result in the fierce labor struggle of nonregular 
workers, not entitled to be members of unions, replacing the labor movement of 
regular workers’ labor unions.
Keywords
financial crisis, precarious work, globalization, nonregular worker, South Korea
Since the financial crisis in December 1997, the drastic growth of precarious work 
and its immediate impact on the course of individuals’ lives and family lives have 
become vexatious issues in South Korea. As the South Korean won plunged in the 
foreign exchange market, driving it down from 844 won to the dollar in January 
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1997 to almost 2,000 won in December 1997, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) provided a “Mexican-style” bailout program to the Korean government under 
the condition that it launched comprehensive neoliberal reforms demanded by the 
IMF. These included reforms in the labor market, the financial market, the public 
sector, and corporate governance (Lim & Jang, 2006; Robison & Hewison, 2010; 
J.-S. Shin & Chang, 2005).
Immediate outcomes of the extensive neoliberal reforms were massive layoffs, 
because of the bankruptcy of corporations or massive restructuring, and the sharp 
increase of nonregular workers such as temporary workers, subcontract workers, and 
dispatched workers. Companies began to replace regular workers with nonregular 
workers and hire mostly nonregular workers for new positions. Thus, the proportion of 
precarious workers in the total working population increased from 27.4% in 2002 to 
37.0% in 2004. Although it stabilized around 34.0% after 2004, the absolute number 
of precarious workers has continuously increased from about 3.8 million in 2002 to 
about 6 million in 2011. Increasing wage inequality became a social and political issue 
as the wage gap between precarious workers and regular, or standard, workers has 
widened from 33.9% in 2002 to 44.6% in 2011 (Korea Labor Institute, 2011, pp. 4-36). 
Both the rise of precarious workers and the deterioration of their economic status have 
contributed to “social polarization,” which became a new buzzword referring to the 
increasing economic inequality and poverty in South Korea.
The central tenet of precarious work refers to economic insecurity or unpredict-
ability because of the changing nature of work itself or unprotected work because of 
the changing regulatory scheme of work (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009; 
Vosko, 2003). Under the guidance of the IMF, president-elect Kim Dae-Jung, a long-
term opposition leader against military dictatorship, formed the Tripartite Committee 
to overcome the financial crisis right after his victory in the presidential election in 
December 1997. He adopted extensive neoliberal economic reforms by deregulating 
the labor market and privatizing the public sector. Roh Moo-Hyun, who succeeded 
Kim Dae-Jung, also implemented neoliberal economic policies, though he unyield-
ingly kept political democratization by installing a human rights committee and an 
anticorruption committee. Persistent neoliberal reforms resulted in an extensive casu-
alization of work and consequently social polarization. The growth of precarious 
workers has led to increasing economic insecurity deeply embedded in the liberalized 
economy. In South Korea, neoliberal reforms initiated by the democratic governments 
have abruptly curtailed job and income security and drastically increased the volatility 
of opportunity in general.
Paradoxically, as the democratic government initiated neoliberal economic reforms 
and reduced economic security of workers, the opposition Grand National Party 
(GNP), the old authoritarian party, had a chance to return to power by promising eco-
nomic growth and economic security to voters during the presidential election in 2007. 
The GNP easily defeated the ruling Uri Party in the presidential election in 2007 as 
disappointed voters switched to the GNP, who claimed credit for the South Korean 
economic miracle in the 1970s and 1980s. Ironically, neoliberal reforms by democratic 
governments undermined their own social base. However, the GNP continued 
 at Stockholm University Library on November 22, 2015abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Shin 3
neoliberal economic policies with tax cuts for the rich, deregulation of the economy, 
and oppression of labor movements, making income distribution and poverty even 
worse than before (for a summary of political-economic developments in South Korea, 
see Figure 1).
This article addresses the issue of precarious work in South Korea, exploring the 
nature of precarious work and the causes of its growth for the past 15 years. The next 
section discusses political contention regarding the definition of nonregular workers in 
South Korea, describing the emergence of a new conceptualization by the Tripartite 
Committee. An official redefining of nonregular workers reflects a changing percep-
tion of new precarious workers and their protests. The third section of the article 
reports statistics on precarious work and precarious workers. Although nonregular 
workers were already a significant part of the workforce prior to the financial crisis in 
1997, the number of precarious workers significantly increased in the postcrisis period 
as an immediate outcome of neoliberal reforms. The fourth section discusses the for-
mation of new types of labor movements by precarious workers in the 2000s as an 
alternative to regular workers’ unions, which did not show much interest in nonregular 
workers. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses their implications 
for research on precarious work.
The Politics of Classification and  
the Rise of Precarious Work
In South Korea, the term nonregular worker had been used to capture marginalized 
workers, including temporary workers and daily workers, until a new definition of 
nonregular worker was coined in 2002. This implies that marginalized workers were 
Figure 1. Dynamics of economy and the politics after 1997
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not recognized as an important social and economic category until neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms were fully implemented after the financial crisis in 1997. However, 
with the growth of marginalized workers, the old definition of nonregular workers 
was contested as social and economic problems associated with nonregular workers 
became more acute in the 2000s. With diversification of precarious work, several 
contending definitions of nonregular workers have emerged in South Korea. Because 
the number of precarious workers became a core of political debates with regard to an 
evaluation of the economic performance of the ruling party and the government, non-
regular workers became the most contested political issue.
Until 2002, various government agencies used their own, different definitions of 
nonregular workers. Nonregular work is defined as a departure from the “standard 
employment relationship” or a full-time, continuous employment relationship (Bosch, 
2004; Vosko, 2010, pp. 3-6). Conventionally, the Ministry of Labor in South Korea 
defined regular workers as those who worked as full-time workers for more than 1 
month. Temporary and daily workers were defined as those who worked more than 45 
days out of the past 90 days. By contrast, the National Statistical Office (NSO) defined 
regular workers as workers whose term of contract is more than 1 year and daily work-
ers as those whose term of contract is less than 1 month. The Ministry of Labor defined 
temporary workers as those who are employed less than 1 month, whereas the NSO 
defined them as workers whose employment ranged between 1 month and 1 year. 
Though the two government agencies used different definitions of nonregular work-
ers, they commonly used only the terms of employment to distinguish nonregular 
workers from regular workers. Labor unions and labor specialists criticized the defini-
tions of nonregular workers by the Ministry of Labor and the NSO as too simple to 
capture varieties of precarious workers such as dispatched workers, contracted work-
ers, and on-call workers. They argued that the government’s definition of nonregular 
workers resulted in reducing the number of nonregular workers and that the drastic 
rise in precarious workers needed to be understood with a more realistic definition of 
nonregular workers.
The Special Committee on Nonregular Workers (SCNW) was established by the 
Tripartite Committee in July 2001. It tried to determine the size and nature of this frag-
ile workforce by making a consensual definition of the concept of nonregular workers 
and the “vulnerable labor workforce” among representatives of labor, capital, and the 
state. A conceptual definition of nonregular workers was the point of departure to iden-
tify the size of this group and to capture the reality of their work life and economic 
status. It was evident that the concept of nonregular workers was a residual concept, 
referring to those who are not regular workers. However, the diversity of nonregular 
workers did not allow for an easy definition because of the fact that the classification of 
workers might affect the immediate economic interests of labor and capital. Legislation 
of a new regulatory scheme associated with nonregular workers might directly affect 
the employment practices of companies and activities of labor unions. It took 1 year to 
arrive at a consensual definition of nonregular workers by the SCNW in July 2002. The 
new definition of nonregular workers is presented in Table 1. The Korea Labor Institute, 
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a government-sponsored institute on labor established right after the financial crisis in 
1997, applied the new definition of nonregular worker to estimate trends in the size of 
nonregular workers since then.
According to the new definition, nonregular workers can be classified in three 
categories: limited-term workers, part-time workers, and atypical workers. Limited-
term workers are workers whose termination of employment is predetermined or 
fixed, unlike regular workers. The contract term of nonregular workers is fixed at 
usually less than 2 years. Some of them are renewable but not guaranteed. Part-time 
workers are those who work less than 36 hours a week. The most significant differ-
ence between the old and new definitions of nonregular workers is that the new one 
includes various types of atypical workers: dispatched workers, subcontract workers, 
special independent workers, home workers, and daily workers. Except for daily 
workers, they are mostly new types of workers whose numbers have rapidly increased 
in the postcrisis period.
Considering the multidimensional aspects of nonregular employment, we can iden-
tify four dimensions of nonregular work in South Korea: terms of employment, 
Table 1. Old and New Classifications of Employment
Old classification New classification
Regular employment
 -Term of employment over and 
equal to 1 year (NSO)
 -Term of employment over and 
equal to 1 month (Ministry of 
Labor)
Temporary employment
 -Term of employment ranging from 
1 month to less than 1 year 
(NSO)
 -Term of employment less than 1 
month (Ministry of Labor)
Daily employment
 -Term of contract with less than one 
month (NSO)
 -Daily employment (Ministry of 
Labor)
Regular employment
 -Full-time, long-term employment
Limited-term contract employment
 -Fixed-term contract
 -Not fixed but renewable contract
 -Not fixed and nonrenewable contract
Part-time employment
 -Work less than 36 hours a week
Atypical employment
 -Dispatch workers: workers who are 
employed by an employment agency to 
provide services to a third party
 -Subcontract workers: workers who work 
in other places or enterprises though 
they are controlled and compensated by 
employers
 -Independent contract workers: those who 
work dependently but not hired
 -Home workers: work in their own house, 
but the nature of work is the same as 
that of workers in factory
 -Daily workers: those who work according 
to the demands of work without a 
contract
NSO = National Statistical Office.
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working hours, unity versus disunity of users and payer of employees, and the nature 
of the work contract.
First, the term of contract is the most significant dimension in identifying precari-
ous workers as a residual category of workers. Precariousness of work derives from 
the insecurity of employment because of short-term contracts and low wages because 
of short working hours. Thus, the term of contract can be used to distinguish various 
precarious workers from full-time, permanent workers.
Second, the number of working hours is another important aspect of precarious 
work since it is directly related to the level of compensation as well as job security. 
Part-time workers receive lower wages than full-time workers, and their jobs are less 
secure when the economy is not performing well. Thus, the number of working hours 
is also an indicator of job quality; too many and too few working hours are indicators 
of bad jobs.
Third, unity versus disunity of the employer and payer is an important dimension. 
There might be workers under the control of one employer who are paid by another 
employer. Usually, either an employment agency or a company is responsible for the 
payroll of those workers. Dispatched workers and subcontract workers have disunity 
over control of the labor process and entity that pays their wages. Dispatched workers 
are those who are employed by an employment agency to provide services to a third 
party. Subcontract workers are those who are employed by companies responsible for 
parts of production that are controlled by larger companies. Both types of workers are 
subject to a tripartite employment relationship, as they display disunity in their labor 
power and the supplier of their wages.
Finally, some nonregular workers have business-like contracts rather than labor 
contracts. Independent contract workers and home workers are doing the same work 
as employed workers often do, but individual contractors pay for their work. The 
Labor Standard Law does not protect them since their work is based not on a labor 
contract but on a private contract based on civil laws. Because companies externalize 
their work to reduce labor costs, some parts of production and transportation are out-
sourced to independent individuals. Consequently, independent workers are partly 
working for companies and partly self-employed in their contracts. For example, 
homeschool teachers, caddies at golf courses, and insurance planners subcontract with 
companies. However, they are not allowed to organize unions because they are not 
considered to be workers.
One dispute between the government and labor organizations over the definition of 
nonregular workers is whether workers with open-ended term contracts can be consid-
ered nonregular workers. Since making employment contracts is not a common con-
vention between temporary workers and employers and employment is assumed to 
continue if there is no prior notice, the government and its institutes have adopted a 
narrow definition of nonregular workers excluding those “permanent temporary work-
ers,” who are temporary workers without fixed-term contracts. In contrast, labor unions 
and some scholars classify them as nonregular workers because their job security is not 
guaranteed. Although the government classifies most fixed-term contract workers as 
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regular workers, labor organizations classify them as nonregular workers. Therefore, 
compared to regular workers, the level of employment insecurity of fixed-term contract 
workers is very high. It also varies according to the market situation. Since permanent 
temporary workers numbered 3.53 million (24% of the total employees) in 2003, the 
proportion of nonregular workers estimated by researchers has displayed huge discrep-
ancies (Tripartite Committee, 2003, pp. 389-397).
Two distinctive features of precarious work also persist in South Korea. One is that 
the self-employed are often precarious workers in the sense that their income insecurity 
and job insecurity of the self-employed are not much different from those of nonregular 
workers. A large proportion of the self-employed have been experiencing hardship 
because of low income and economic insecurity. In 2008, one third of the economically 
active population in South Korea was self-employed, which is close to the proportion in 
Brazil. By 2007, 74.5% of the self-employed were working in the service sector. Almost 
45% of the self-employed in the service sector are in jobs in the wholesale, retail, restau-
rant, and hotel industries (Keum, Kim, Cho, & Cho, 2009, p. 43).
The average income of the self-employed with small shops or small farmlands was 
almost the same as that for all workers. One study showed that almost 25% of workers 
belong to the informal sector in which legal and institutional regulations are not 
applied (J.-Y. Kim, 2009, p. 95). Furthermore, the self-employed in the informal econ-
omy suffer from economic insecurity and poverty. As Table 2 shows, the economic 
status of the self-employed is much worse than that of regular workers. The wage level 
of the self-employed is in between that of regular workers and that of nonregular 
workers. Thus, in short, a large proportion of the working population is self-employed, 
with a very low economic status (also see Table 2).
Another distinct feature of precariousness of work in South Korea is that of the 
employed. It is surprising that South Korea already had a very high level of nonregular 
workers before the financial crisis. Although an explosion of nonregular workers was 
observed after the financial crisis in 1997, the proportion of nonregular workers to 
Table 2. Income Distribution by Employment Status of Household (%)
1st 
quartile
2nd 
quartile
3rd 
quartile
4th 
quartile
Annual income 
(10,000 won)
Proportion of 
poor households
Regular worker 8.2 25.9 31.8 34.0 4,303.0 15.3
Nonregular worker 30.5 33.3 26.7 9.5 2,551.7 41.8
Employer 6.8 13.7 22.1 57.4 6,626.0 10.7
Self-employed 21.3 13.7 30.4 20.3 3,253.1 30.0
Unemployed 52.8 20.8 13.9 12.5 2,246.9 60.6
Source: Lee, Hong, Lee, Kang, and Yun (2010, p. 22).
The poverty rate is measured by the proportion of households with an income less than two thirds of 
the median income of the total workforce. Based on panel data from the 11th Korea Labor Income Panel 
Survey.
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regular workers was already high in the early 1990s. For example, the proportion of 
daily workers, one of the older types of nonregular workers, was 14.9% of the total 
employed population in 1992 and 13.6% in 1996 (NSO, 1992, 1996). However, it was 
not fully recognized as a serious problem by scholars and policy makers until the 
2000s, when new types of nonregular workers were identified so as to regulate them 
under the labor relations law. The government began to report new types of nonstan-
dard workers only after receiving assistance from the IMF in 1998 and the agreement 
within the Tripartite Committee was made. With the proliferation of new types of 
employment and expansion of nonregular workers, the economic status and working 
conditions of the core workers as well as marginal workers deteriorated. Furthermore, 
the issue of nonregular workers became a social and political issue.
Statistics on Precarious Work
Statistics on precarious workers depend on the definition of nonregular workers. As 
discussed above, there is no consensus on the definition of nonregular workers. 
Although the government and governmental institutes declare very low rates of non-
regular workers, labor unions declare much higher rates of nonregular workers. For 
example, in 2001, the Korea Development Institute, a governmental economic insti-
tute, estimated that the proportion of nonregular workers was 27.3%, whereas the 
Korea Labor & Society Institute, an institute organized by labor activists, asserted that 
it was 55.7% (Y.-S. Kim, 2010). The huge gap between the two estimates is simply 
based on different definitions of nonregular workers. Thus, the definition of the non-
regular workers and the estimation of the size of the nonregular worker population 
became contested issues in the 2000s.
Size
According to the new definition of nonregular workers, the Korea Labor Institute has 
provided estimates of the number of nonregular workers and the proportion of non-
regular workers since 2002. Table 3 shows the trend of nonregular workers from 2002 
to 2011. The proportion of nonregular workers sharply increased from 2002 to 2004, 
then decreased slightly and stabilized after that. There was an increase of almost 1.55 
million nonregular workers over 2 years, from 2002 to 2004, equivalent to 9.6% of 
total employees. It seems to have stabilized around 35% in the late 2000s. From 2002 
to 2004, there was comprehensive restructuring of the economy with the downsizing, 
merging, and acquisition of firms.
Looking at the trend of subcategories of nonregular workers, we can identify a 
steady increase of part-time workers, daily workers, and subcontract workers and a 
steady decrease of home workers and special employment workers. Although the larg-
est increase of nonregular workers was found among fixed-term workers, the most 
rapid growth of nonregular workers was observed among daily workers. Part-time 
workers, dispatched workers, and subcontract workers also more than doubled over a 
 at Stockholm University Library on November 22, 2015abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
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decade. With the crisis pact among labor, capital, and the state in 2002, dispatched 
workers were introduced to enhance labor market flexibility. Dispatched workers, 
allowed in limited types of jobs, were extended to a more extensive group of jobs. The 
IMF strongly recommended legalization of dispatched workers for enterprises, to 
allow dispatched workers to be hired more freely in security, cleaning, production, and 
clerical sectors. In the economic crisis, the Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU), 
the old confederation of labor unions sponsored by the state, and the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), representing the militant labor movement 
alternative to the FKTU, accepted the deal between labor and capital in the Tripartite 
Committee. They conceded to the demands of business for greater flexibility in the 
labor market in exchange for establishing basic workers’ rights, including the legaliza-
tion of teachers’ unions.
As nonregular employment became more pervasive, neoliberal reforms became a 
subject of political debate. Unions and civil society organizations began to criticize 
neoliberal reforms since they generated massive numbers of precarious workers with 
low pay and low protection. Unions demanded regulation of abuse of fixed-term work-
ers and asked them to be converted into regular workers after 1 year. Big corporations 
hired fixed-term workers to reduce labor costs and weaken the power of unions since 
only regular workers were entitled to be members of a union. Thus, large companies 
such as Hyundai Motor Company and Korail utilized large numbers of fixed-term 
workers. After several years of contestation between labor and capital, new regula-
tions on nonregular employment were passed in the National Assembly on November 
20, 2006. An immediate impact on nonregular employment was a decrease in the num-
ber of fixed-term workers. The proportion of fixed-term employment (fixed-term 
workers and casual workers) began to decrease in 2006, and in contrast temporary 
workers and daily workers increased.
Subcontract workers also increased from 332,000 in 2002 to 672,000 in 2011. Big 
chaebol companies in the manufacturing sector mostly utilized these subcontract 
workers. In the manufacturing industry, 23.1% of firms with more than 500 employees 
used in-house subcontracting workers in 2004 (Eun, 2008, p. 274). For example, more 
than 70% of workers at the Ulsan factory of Hyundai Mobis, one of the major Hyundai-
affiliated companies supplying parts to Hyundai Motor Company, are in-house sub-
contract workers. Subcontract workers at Samsung Heavy Industry Company, one of 
the core companies of the Samsung group, represent 57% of the total workers for the 
company (S.-Y. Kim, 2011).
One of the characteristics of precarious workers in South Korea is that although the 
proportion of nonregular workers is very high, the proportion of part-time workers is 
very low, at less than 10%, less than half that of major European countries (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2010, p. 257). Although the 
proportion increased from 8.8% in 2006 to 10.7% in 2011, it is still much lower than 
that of major OECD countries. For example, in 2009, the proportion of part-time 
workers varied from 13.3% in France to 36.7% in Netherlands in the OECD. In Japan, 
where nonregular workers increased in a pattern similar to that of South Korea, it was 
20.3%, almost twice that of South Korea, in 2009. Considering the very high rate of 
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nonstandard workers in South Korea, the low rate of part-time workers indicates that 
the majority of nonregular workers are working as full-time nonregular workers.
Precarious work is highly gendered, especially among those who are at their peak 
age for economic activity. As Figure 2 indicates, the proportion of nonregular workers 
among women aged 30 or older is almost twice that of men. The largest gender gap in 
nonregular workers can be found in the age group in their 40s: 28.9% of men in that 
age group were nonregular workers in 2010, compared to 67.5% of women (Y.-S. 
Kim, 2011, pp. 15-17). By contrast, there is only a very small gender difference in the 
proportion of nonregular workers in their 20s. These differences suggest that the femi-
nization of precarious work has been an important source of the sex segregation of 
work and gender inequality.
Nonregular workers are concentrated in small firms. The proportion of nonregular 
workers in firms with more than 300 employees was 17.2%, whereas it was 46.1% in 
firms with fewer than 5 employees. Almost half of nonregular workers are in small firms 
with fewer than 10 employees. Only about 6% of nonregular workers are in large firms 
with more than 300 employees (Korea Labor Institute [KLI], 2011, pp. 29-31). Considering 
the fact that the proportion of regular workers in firms with fewer than 10 employees was 
31.2%, nonregular workers are disproportionately concentrated in small firms.
Nonstandard employment is diffused to entire industrial sectors, from manufactur-
ing to service sectors. Almost all companies replaced regular workers with various 
types of nonstandard workers such as dispatched workers, temporary workers, 
Figure 2. Proportion of nonregular workers by age and gender (%)
Source: Y.-S. Kim (2010, p.64).
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short-term workers, and outsourced workers to reduce their labor costs. The prolif-
eration of new types of nonstandard workers has led to a rapidly changing employ-
ment system and labor market since the late 1990s.
Job Quality
The expansion of precarious work and the feminization of nonregular work have led 
to a widening of wage disparity. The average monthly wage of nonregular workers 
relative to that of regular workers has continuously decreased from 67.1% in 2002 to 
56.4% in 2011 (KLI, 2011, p. 36). As Table 4 displays, both nonregular male workers 
and nonregular female workers have experienced an increasing wage gap in compari-
son to regular male workers. In 2003, the average wage of nonregular male workers 
was 56% of the average wage of regular male workers; in 2010, this ratio had 
decreased to 47.9%. We observe a similar trend among female nonregular workers. In 
sum, this shows that the economic status of nonregular workers has been deteriorating 
for both men and women in the past decade.
There is also a remarkable wage disparity among nonregular workers. The size of 
the enterprise is an important source of variation in the wages of nonregular workers. 
Nonregular workers working in small and medium-sized enterprises are the most 
deprived workers in South Korea. As we have already seen in Table 5, nonregular 
workers receive much lower wages than regular workers. Nonregular workers work-
ing in firms with fewer than 30 employees earn less than 60% of the wages of 
Table 5. Wage Differentials of Nonregular Workers by Size of Enterprise in 2007
Size of enterprise (employees) Relative proportion of wage (%)
300+ 100
100-299 78
30-99 65
10-29 58
5-9 51
1-4 42
Source: Korea Labor Institute (2011, p. 201).
Table 4. Wage Disparity by Type of Employment and Gender, 2003–2010
Type 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Male regular 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Female regular 68.9 69.4 69.6 70.1 68.0 67.4 68.5 67.3
Male nonregular 56.0 55.3 54.0 54.3 53.1 51.0 49.4 47.9
Female nonregular 41.5 43.0 41.2 41.5 39.4 40.4 39.0 38.3
Source: Y.-S. Kim (2011, p. 26).
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nonregular workers in firms with more than 300 employees. Recognizing the fact that 
almost 70% of nonregular workers are working in firms with fewer than 29 employ-
ees, at least two thirds of workers in South Korea suffer from extremely low wages. In 
short, they are “ghetto workers” in South Korea.
In addition to nonregular workers, self-employment in the formal sector composes 
another part of precarious work. Self-employed persons with no employees consti-
tuted almost 60% of the total self-employed in 2011 (NSO, 2011, p. 22). They are an 
insecure and fragile labor force, not much different from nonregular workers. Table 6 
presents the proportion of the poor by type of employment in 2010. (The definition of 
poverty used in Table 6 is comparable to that used in other statistics produced by the 
OECD.) With the exception of two groups, employers and regular workers, all other 
types of employment show very high levels of poverty. Daily workers showed the 
highest poverty rate at 31.81%, which is not very different from that of the unem-
ployed. The self-employed, one fourth of the economically active population, also 
show a high level of poverty, indicating that the economic status of the self-employed 
in South Korea is extremely precarious.
Regarding nonregular workers, one of the key features of the South Korean labor mar-
ket is the short job tenure compared to that in other OECD countries. Job tenure, as mea-
sured by the length of time workers are in their current job or with their current employer, 
indicates the degree of job stability or instability of employees. The average job tenure of 
Korean workers is less than 5 years, shorter than that of the United States. It is almost less 
than half that of European countries (K.-Y. Shin, 2011, p. 17). Job security of nonregular 
workers in South Korea is extremely low. The shortest job tenure can be found among 
South Korean female workers, with an average tenure of 2.9 years. This implies that both 
male and female workers in Korea suffer from very low levels of job security. Given that 
frequent job changers are not favored in South Korea since they are regarded as unreliable 
employees, having low job security depresses the quality of working life.
Table 6. Distribution of the Poor by Type of Employment (%)
Type of employment Poor Not poor
Self-employment
 Employer 2.18 97.82
 Self-employed 24.77 75.23
 Family work 27.07 72.93
Employees
 Regular worker 3.30 96.70
 Temporary worker 13.20 86.80
 Daily worker 31.81 68.19
Unemployment
 Unemployed 33.22 66.78
Source: Lee, Hong, Lee, Kang, and Yun (2010, p. 60).
The poverty rate is defined by the proportion of the working people earning below 50% of median 
household income.
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The quality of working life of nonregular workers has been getting worse. Although 
the job tenure of regular workers has been increasing gradually, the job tenure of non-
regular workers has been decreasing. With the exception of special employment work, 
dispatched work and subcontract work, the median job tenure of all the other nonregu-
lar workers is less than 1 year and diminishes continuously (Y.-S. Kim, 2010, p. 86).
Nonregular workers and the self-employed are socially excluded strata exempted 
from social protection. As Table 7 displays, nonregular workers are exposed to various 
social risks such as unemployment and retirement. Although there is not a big differ-
ence in health care between regular workers and nonregular workers, there are remark-
able differences in pension and unemployment insurance coverage between the two. 
The majority of nonregular workers do not have access to a pension system or unem-
ployment insurance managed by employers or the state. Sometimes both employers 
and nonregular workers do not want to contribute to pension plans or insurance 
schemes simply because they want to save their contributions. Nonregular workers do 
not earn enough wages to make a living, and so substantial numbers are voluntarily not 
participating in the pension system. Therefore, nonregular workers are much more 
vulnerable to economic uncertainty compared to regular workers.
There is huge variation in social protection across subtypes of nonregular workers. 
The least protected nonregular workers are part-time workers, home workers, and spe-
cial workers. The majority of them are not covered by pension plans. Roughly 81.6% 
of part-time workers and 85.7% of home workers are covered by unemployment insur-
ance, which was introduced by the government in 1995. Unemployment insurance 
coverage expanded to all employees in firms with fewer than five employees in 1999. 
In contrast, limited-term workers, daily workers, and subcontract workers are better 
covered by pension plans and unemployment insurance.
Politics and Labor Protests
The dispute associated with precarious workers culminated in the second half of 2006 
when the national assembly began to discuss regulatory schemes for precarious 
Table 7. Proportion Not Covered by Social Protection Among Nonregular Workers by 
Subtypes in 2011 (%)
Type of nonregular workers
 
Regular 
workers
Nonregular 
workers
Limited 
term
Part-
time Daily Dispatched Subcontract Home Special
Pension 1.4 54.8 54.8 81.6 27.0 76.1 36.7 85.7 64.7
Health care 0.0 5.3 5.4 2.8 4.5 3.3 2.6 2.9 3.6
Unemployment 
insurance
2.6 64.b 66.0 31.3 44.3 28.4 25.8 91.4 96.0
Source: Y.-S. Kim (2011, p. 93).
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employment. Roh Moo-Hyun was elected in 2004 because he was a human rights 
lawyer and promised to improve the life of the oppressed and the underprivileged.
In November 2006, there was a compromise between the ruling party and the con-
servative opposition party, based on concessions in timing of implementation of new 
regulatory schemes covering nonregular workers. They agreed that the law would be 
implemented gradually and the maximum period for employing nonregular workers 
would be limited to 2 years. The agreement would also be implemented step by step. 
First, beginning in July 1, 2007, companies with more than 300 employees would give 
regular employment status to nonregular workers after working for 2 years. For compa-
nies with more than 100 employees and fewer than 300, the new law would be applied 
starting July 1, 2008. For other small companies, it would be applied from July 1, 2009.
Labor activists and social movement organizations demanded regulatory schemes 
to reduce the proportion of nonregular workers and improve working conditions of 
nonregular workers. The upsurge of discourse on social polarization and the working 
poor highlighted the issue of nonregular workers. Rising inequality in wage and 
income became a political issue as social movement organizations and progressive 
intellectuals criticized President Roh for not fulfilling his promises. Discourse on 
social polarization became commonplace and public in media reports and political 
debates. However, both the ruling party and the opposition party, except the Democratic 
Labor Party, the smallest minority party, did not want to change the practice of non-
regular employment because of strong opposition from businesses. Thus, both parties 
agreed on the passage of the new law on nonregular employment without generating 
significant changes in the labor market.
After the passage of the Nonregular Employment Law in November 2006, however, 
regular workers’ unions were less interested in the issues of nonregular workers simply 
because nonregular workers are not union members. The labor law stipulated that only 
full-time regular workers could be members of unions in companies where they work. 
Thus, issues of nonregular workers were not in their interest as soon as the Nonregular 
Employment Law was passed in the National Assembly. Though the KCTU still sup-
ports nonregular workers’ struggle for changing employment relations and improving 
their working conditions at the confederation level, rank-and-file company unions are 
not interested in those issues. Nonregular workers have to express their discontent and 
demands on their own. This led nonregular workers to find support for their struggle 
outside workplaces, especially in social movement organizations.
The majority of workers are outside of the industrial relations system governed by 
the state, simply because only 10% of regular workers in big corporations are orga-
nized. Almost 70% of labor disputes have taken place at small and medium-sized 
enterprises with nonregular workers since 2000 (KLI, 2011). Although fewer than 3% 
of nonregular workers were organized, they began to engage in fierce struggles for 
changing nonregular workers’ status to regular workers (KLI, 2011, p. 52). They 
became key actors in labor relations in the 2000s. Regular workers’ unions in con-
glomerates, mostly in the export sector, enjoyed high wages because of the continuous 
increase of export volumes by conglomerates. Enterprise unions could share high 
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profits with those conglomerates. Because the labor law imposes the rule that nonregu-
lar workers cannot be members of unions in their workplace, the gap between orga-
nized regular workers and nonregular workers has widened more than ever before.
Thus, the labor politics of nonregular workers were totally dependent on social 
movements or nonregular workers themselves. Citizen’s movement organizations 
(CMOs) have developed since the early 1990s, playing key social and political roles. 
Progressive intellectuals and CMOs have raised the issue of precarious work as an 
outcome of neoliberal globalization after the financial crisis, criticizing government 
economic and labor market policies. Some CMOs began to mobilize critical voices 
against the abuse of nonregular workers and to support strikes by nonregular workers 
(K.-Y. Shin, 2010).
Nonregular workers’ struggles had far greater impacts on the politics and public 
opinions than did CMOs in the late 2000s. Because nonregular workers’ struggles 
could not get attention from the public, they chose the most extreme forms of struggle, 
including demonstrations on top of chimneys of factories, sit-in strikes, hunger strikes, 
and sometimes suicide until media reported their struggles. The repertoire of their 
struggles has not been changing much because there were no alternative forms of 
struggle available. Since they could not get support from unions organized by regular 
workers, they chose extreme forms of protest to get public attention and media cover-
age (K.-Y. Shin, 2010, pp. 224-226).
There have been several successful struggles. One example is the case of Kiryung 
Electronics, in which female nonregular workers waged a 1,895-day strike, the longest 
strike in Korea. This changed the tide of the nonregular workers’ movement. A group of 
250 female dispatched workers at Kiryung Electronics, a manufacturer of Sirius Satellite 
Radio equipment, organized a union in July 2005. The union waged a strike until 
November 1, 2010, and the 250 female workers demanded transfer of their employment 
status from nonregular to direct regular employees of Kiryung Electronics. Because the 
company hired only 50 regular workers on the production line, most of the production 
was done by the 250 dispatched female workers. The company exploited these workers 
by forcing to them to work for 13 to 14 hours for below-subsistence wages (National 
Labor Committee, 2008). The company dismissed them simply because they were not 
directly hired workers. The dismissed workers applied extreme forms of protests, such 
as hair shaving, hunger strikes, and chimney strikes. Eventually, it succeeded in attract-
ing public concern and mass support from civil society. Students and citizens as well as 
union activists joined the rally supporting the strikes, and it became a symbol of struggle 
by nonregular workers by increasing media coverage. Though only 10 female dispatched 
workers remained after the 1,895-day strike, they made an agreement with the company 
to hire them as regular workers in November 1, 2010.
Solidarity between social movements and nonregular workers’ struggles has exerted 
great impacts on setting agendas, as the media began to report the issues that nonregu-
lar workers raised. When the demands of nonregular workers became an issue of pub-
lic discourse, the possibility of the success of nonregular workers’ struggles drastically 
increased. Their voices, however, remained hidden and invisible until the media 
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reported them. Thus, media coverage became a key weapon of strikers. The engage-
ment of CMOs in nonregular workers’ strikes generated a new form of social move-
ment, one of solidarity between labor and civil society.
Conclusions
The drastic increase of nonregular workers has been a significant change in the labor 
market in South Korea. The financial crisis in 1997 and subsequent neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms generated massive layoffs and an explosion of nonregular employment 
with proliferation of new types of precarious employment. Neoliberal economic poli-
cies that were enacted during the postcrisis period thoroughly transformed the labor 
market with proliferation of nonregular workers in a very short period.
Although South Korean workers’ demands were severely oppressed by the authori-
tarian state in the 1980s and early 1990s, they were controlled by the whip of the lib-
eralized market in the 2000s. The masters of the market, in fact, are big corporations 
freely exerting pressure on the government to deregulate the market. Subsequent labor 
market policies have generated precarious workers. In particular, female nonregular 
workers in small and medium-sized companies are the most disadvantaged workers in 
South Korea, with extremely low wages and job insecurity.
Although the nonregular workforce was not so small prior to the financial crisis, 
they were not very visible. Unions mostly organized regular workers in big companies 
and played a leading role in the labor struggle in the late 1980s. After the social pact 
was made that allowed the discharge of redundant workers and instead the hiring of 
nonregular workers among labor, capital, and the state in 1998, the number of non-
regular workers increased drastically. The massive expansion of precarious workers 
contributed to worsening wage inequality and a rise in the working poor.
In addition, those who were displaced from the labor market by layoffs or early 
retirement moved to the self-employment sector. Thus, self-employment became 
another type of precarious work, composing more than one fourth of the total labor 
force in South Korea. In particular, self-employment without employees composes 
almost half of self-employment, showing a very high rate of poverty.
Although protests by nonregular workers became more visible than ever before, 
nonregular workers are not well organized because of their work environment, tempo-
rary employment, and disunity of workplace and compensation for their work. Though 
it was hard to mobilize nonregular workers because of the fragmentation of their 
working environment, accumulation of protests and discontent contributed to the 
building of unions among nonregular workers. The rapid growth of strikes by non-
regular workers succeeded in attracting public attention and concern in the past 3 
years. This contributed to making the issue of nonregular work a major social and 
political issue during the presidential and general elections. The precarious work issue 
became political as labor activists and civic organizations began to mobilize massive 
citizen support for striking nonregular workers and the opposition party began to 
engage in protests against the neoliberal regulatory regime.
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